Shulou(Shulou.com)11/24 Report--

The original title: "what's so great about Japanese semiconductors?" "

Japanese semiconductors are no longer as brave as they were in the 1980s, but their ambitions remain the same. On April 25, the Japanese government provided a supplementary subsidy of 260 billion yen to the local semiconductor company Rapidus, together with the previous 70 billion yen, invested a total of 330 billion yen to specialize in 2nm process technology. In addition, the country recently followed in the footsteps of the United States in imposing export controls on 23 types of semiconductor equipment.

So, what is so great about Japan now? why is it so eager to restrict China's semiconductor industry? what is the real situation of the development in various fields? what are the implications for the domestic semiconductor industry?

1. From low-price dumping to collapse, Japan has shown strong international competitiveness in many fields, such as textiles, steel, color televisions, cars, semiconductors, and so on, which has put pressure on the United States and led to many trade frictions between the two sides [2]. This is particularly prominent in the history of the development of semiconductors in Japan, which is divided into several periods: following catch-up, turning prosperity to decline, and reshaping advantages. [3]

Japanese semiconductors started very early, and the Industrial Cooperation Act was passed in 1951. At that time, transistors had been published for 20 years, and all countries in the world were exploring more miniaturized electronic circuits until Jack Gill invented the integrated circuit in 1958. The industry is really on the right track [4]. During this period, there has been a gap in the development of semiconductors between Japan and the United States, and the real development has been since the economic recovery after the war.

In the 1960s, "buy" was synonymous with Japanese enterprises at that time. In 1953, Sony introduced a transistor technology patent to Westinghouse, which reduced the cost of trial production of a transistor from $11 to $0.50 in 1958; in 1959, Sony, NEC, Sanyo, Toshiba and other companies produced 86.5 million transistors a year, more than the birthplace of the United States [3]; in 1962, Nippon Electric bought planar lithography technology from American Immortals. You know, at that time, the monthly salary of workers at Tokyo Electronics Factory was less than US $30, while that in the United States was as high as US $380. Low labor costs and bought technology made the development of Japanese semiconductors amazing. [5]

Of course, simply buying technology to make chips can never catch up with the market demand. In the early 1970s, Japan's computer industry was still more than 10 years behind the United States, and perhaps Japan realized that this style of play could not compete strongly with American companies, so it turned its attention to VLSI (very large-scale integrated circuits). To put it simply, the larger the scale of integrated circuits, the more components in the same area, the more advanced the technology is.

What do you do, VLSI? We have no choice but to spend money. From 1970 to 1977, R & D funds for semiconductor manufacturing equipment in Japan accounted for 26% of total R & D expenditure, up from 2% [6]. One of the most critical investments was in 1976, when the Japanese government raised 72 billion yen to guide Hitachi, NEC, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi, Toshiba and NEC to implement the VLSI (very large scale integrated circuit) program, focusing on DRAM (dynamic random access memory). At the same time, the other two laboratories (CDL and NTIS) also conducted forward-looking application research on design and equipment in smaller market segments. In just four years, the VLSI Research Association applied for 1000 patents, of which 601 obtained patents [7] and developed electron beam lithography (EBL) technology, paving the way for semiconductor manufacturing, while EBL was eventually commercialized by ASML, Nikon and Canon.

Under the continuous R & D investment of VLSI, Japan launched 64K DRAM almost at the same time as the United States in the late 1970s. In order to occupy more markets, Japan launched price reduction promotion, which caused a severe shock in the world semiconductor market. Take the 64K DRAM, for example, Japan has reduced its price from $28 to $6 a year. [7]

Market data never deceive people. In the early 1980s, the United States was undoubtedly overtaken by Japan's low-price dumping strategy, and its status was still rising. In 1984, Japan took the lead in developing 1MB DRAM;1986. The market share of Japanese memory was once as high as 65%, while that of the United States was only 30%. In 1988, Japan accounted for 51% of global semiconductor sales. From the point of view of the company's sales at that time, from 1980 to 1988, the annual sales of NEC increased from $3.8 billion to $21.9 billion, while that of GTE in the United States increased from $9.98 billion to $16.46 billion, which was significantly lower than that of Japan.

Such a situation makes it impossible for the anxious US to sit idly by and regard Japan as its biggest competitor.

In 1985, the American Semiconductor Industry Association imposed a 100% penalty tariff on 300 million US dollars worth of chips exported from Japan to the United States on the grounds that there was abnormal equipment investment in the Japanese semiconductor industry.

In 1986, Intel and many other semiconductor companies jointly urged the government to formulate a five-year "Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement," imposing a series of sanctions on Japan, such as restrictive import quotas, high tariffs, and restrictions on the export of chip equipment and materials by US companies to Japan. Japan is afraid of being completely excluded from the market by the United States and make concessions.

In 1987, the United States established the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Research Consortium (SEMATECH) to increase investment in semiconductors.

In 1991, Japan and the United States renewed the Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement, which clearly requires that American-made chips must have a 20% market share in Japan [8]. However, the Japanese government, on the other hand, is weakening its support for the semiconductor industry, and the advantages accumulated before have been gradually eroded. [9]

In the 1990s, the semiconductor industry is no longer confined to the IDM (design, manufacturing, packaging and testing integration) business model, and began to be divided into highly specialized companies such as Foundry (wafer foundry) and Fabless (design). TSMC was born in 1987 and became the first pure wafer foundry. During this period, the Japanese government believes that companies should not reinvest in manufacturing infrastructure and instead shift more capacity to the design side.

In 2001, Japan invested more than 300 million US dollars to set up Rizhiwan Foundry in conjunction with 11 companies, aiming to promote Japan's semiconductor industry from IDM to Fabless. While this initiative is indeed good for the semiconductor industry at first, it weakens the diversity of manufacturers and makes it difficult for the industrial structure to adapt to the future competitive environment. In addition, at that time, Japanese enterprises'R & D investment was greatly reduced, bringing a series of chain reactions. In 2005, the government called on Hitachi, Toshiba and Renesas to jointly build a 65nm factory. In the end, the three companies agreed that the shared factory was difficult to commercialize, and ended the proposal in 2006. [6]

Since then, Japan's semiconductor industry has collapsed, with Panasonic, Sony and Sharp running a combined deficit of more than 1.6 trillion yen in March 2012. In the same year, Japan's proud storage manufacturer Erpida and car semiconductor giant Renesas successively fell into operational crisis.

From the perspective of market ranking, Japan's top 10 market share accounted for 60% of the world's market share in 1985. By 2019, the United States accounted for more than 55% of the world's IC (semiconductor component products) market sales, Korean enterprises accounted for 21%, while Japanese enterprises accounted for only 6%, and no Japanese semiconductor company entered the world's top 10 [2]. Up to now, although Japan still has the absolute say in the upper reaches of materials and equipment, it accounts for only 10% of the global semiconductor market share. [11]

The top 10 semiconductor manufacturers in the world and their output value changes [2] Ten years east and ten years Hexi, although the scenery was once boundless, but now semiconductors have become political props in Japan. In 2019, Japan restricted the export of fluorinated polyimide, photoresist and high-purity hydrogen fluoride semiconductor process materials to South Korea. South Korea's dependence on Japan on fluorinated polyimide, photoresist and high-purity hydrogen fluoride is as high as 93.7%, 91.9% and 43.9% respectively [12], disrupting the process of South Korean semiconductor industry, and the two sides did not reach a settlement until 2023. [13]

In March 2023, Japan also said that from July, it would add 6 types of 23 kinds of high-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment (below the 14nm~10nm process) to export control objects to China, involving chip cleaning, deposition, lithography, etching and other links. Dozens of Japanese companies, such as Tokyo Electronics (Tokyo Electron), SCREEN (SCREEN) and Nikon, may be affected by the control. [14]

Japan does not lie flat on this, and still dreams of returning to the top again. In order to achieve this goal, Japan has launched two measures in the past two years: on the one hand, it has introduced TSMC into Japan. Of the 774 billion yen in semiconductor subsidies announced in 2021, 614 billion yen will be used to support TSMC's Kumamoto factory and the armour's Yokkaichi factory. On the other hand, through the Rapidus established by eight large Japanese enterprises, such as Denso, Sony, NTT, NEC, Softbank Corp., Leixia and Mitsubishi UFJ Bank, we can conquer the latest 2nm and 1nm process technology. So far, the scale of subsidies planned by Japan has reached 2 trillion yen in order to develop semiconductors. [15]

Although Japan spares no effort to pour money into semiconductors, no one can judge whether it is effective or not. It should be pointed out that under the geopolitical friction, the status of semiconductors is highlighted, and not subsidizing semiconductors now will only make Japan's economic prospects even more bleak.

2, eating the "old capital" of materials and equipment has a rough history, and missed the best opportunity to occupy the market, Japan's semiconductor industry is still based on sub-areas.

Japan, which lags behind in manufacturing, is now paying more attention to the fields of materials and equipment, which have a smaller market and relatively lower profit margins, but are more technically difficult. Because of the over-subdivision of these areas and the high demand for a technical base, Japan, which seems to be struggling to survive, has now formed a unique monopoly wall. [16]

According to CSET data, Japan's EDA, IP core, design, Fab (foundry) and ATP (assembly test and packaging, assembly, testing, packaging) all account for less than or equal to 10% of the global market in 2021, with weak competitiveness in related fields, while upstream wafers, manufacturing equipment, and closed test equipment lead the world [17]. Other data show that for a long time, Japan's equipment market share accounts for nearly 40% of the global market, while the materials market accounts for nearly 60%. [18]

The materials involved in the wafer manufacturing of [17] wafers by sector include silicon wafers (38%), masks (13%), electronic gas (13%), CMP materials (13%), photoresist (12%), wet chemicals (5%) and targets (2%). Japanese companies have achieved full coverage of semiconductor materials.

Silicon wafers: large production line investment, high depreciation charges, volatile gross profit margin and signing long-term supply agreements (LTA). The combined market share of Shin-Etsu and Sumco exceeds 50% for a long time. [19]

Mask: 45nm is a watershed. Wafer factories that are more advanced than 45nm are generally produced by their own professional factories, while mature processes tend to choose products from third-party mask manufacturers to get better costs. Big Japan Printing (DNP), letterpress printing (Toppan Photomask) and Hoya (Hoya) have great market dominance, while SKE has 20.2% market share in flat panel display masks; [20]

Electronic special gas: electronic special gas requires extremely high purity, while Dayangri acid accounts for 18% of the global market. For electronic gas used in semiconductors in China, Japanese enterprises such as Kanto Electric, Central nitrate, Showa Electric and so on have shown strong dominance. [21]

CMP materials: in terms of CMP polishing solution, Hitachi Chemical and Fujimi have maintained a combined market share of more than 20% for a long time. In terms of CMP polishing pads, DuPont of the United States has long occupied more than 80% of the market share, while Japan's Fujibo and JSR have occupied single-digit markets. [22]

Photoresist: it is a high-tech barrier material with complex process and high purity requirements. The certification period is 2-3 years. Tokyo Ying Chemical, JSR, Fuji, Shinyue Chemical and Sumitomo Chemistry in Japan are all mainstream manufacturers. Except for DuPont of the United States, Japanese companies can produce EUV photoresist at present. [23]

Wet chemicals: many downstream applications, high technical threshold, fast upgrading, strong functionality, strong attachment, Japanese enterprises have 27% of the global market share, including Kanto Chemical Company, Mitsubishi Chemical, Kyoto Chemical, Sumitomo Chemical, etc. [24]

Targets: in all industries, targets for semiconductors require the highest purity, while Nippon Mineral Metals has a market share of 30%, and Dongcao has a market share of 20%. Japanese targets account for 16% of Chinese mainland semiconductor production capacity in 2021. [25]

From the market point of view, semiconductor materials market demand is strong, but restricted by demand, the outlook is very uncertain, related enterprises are very likely to be affected. According to TechCet data, the market for semiconductor materials is about US $66 billion in 2022, an increase of 8% compared with 2021. The market segment of materials such as CMP grinding mats, specialty gases, precursor materials, and SOI wafers has grown by more than double digits compared with the same period last year. The decrease of memory operating rate in 2023 will inhibit the market of precursor materials, special gases, cleaning chemicals and capacitor materials, while the advanced process nodes below 10nm will be the main growth point of material output in 2023. [26]

Japanese semiconductor materials representative company and current situation (data are traceable most recent data) [27] ~ [36], tabulation, fruit shell hard technology chip manufacturing process The manufacturing equipment involved includes film deposition equipment (27%), etching equipment (22%), measuring equipment (13%), lithography machine (20%), chemical mechanical polishing CMP equipment (4%), cleaning equipment (4%), glue developer (3%), heat treatment equipment (3%), ion implantation equipment (3%), de-gluing equipment (1%) [37]. Japan basically controls all the equipment. However, domestic equipment accounts for only 17.2% of the domestic market. [38]

For example, Tokyo Electronics (TEL) is an all-round expert, owns most semiconductor manufacturing equipment and has a high market share. Nikon and Canon are among the few enterprises other than ASML that can produce advanced lithography machines. The testing and measuring equipment of Advantest, Hitachi High-Tech and Lasertec have strong market dominance, and Tokyo Precision (Accretech) and DISCO wafer cutting equipment compete strongly. Japan's Ehara CMP equipment and Zhipu solid crystal equipment also have a place in the market.

Japanese semiconductor equipment representative companies and current situation (data are traceable recent data) [39] ~ [47], tabulation? fruit shell hard technology from the market data, in the field of semiconductor equipment in 2022, Japanese enterprises accounted for about 30% of the global market share [48]. According to Tech Insights data, total sales of semiconductor equipment by Japanese enterprises in 2021 were 3.4 trillion yen, of which Tokyo Electronics (TEL) ranked third, Edwin Test (Advantest) ranked sixth, SCREEN (SCREEN) ranked seventh, American Teradyne (Teradyne) ranked eighth, Kokusai Electric ranked ninth, Hitachi Hi-Tech (Hitachi High-Tech) ranked 12th, Canon (Canon) ranked 14th, and DISCO ranked 15th. [49]

The global share of semiconductor equipment is growing steadily, while Japanese companies are very dependent on the Chinese market. Global shipments of semiconductor manufacturing equipment rose 5% in 2022 from $102.6 billion in 2021 to an all-time high of $107.6 billion, according to the SEMI report. In 2022, Japan exported more than 820 billion yen of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to Chinese mainland, and Chinese mainland is the largest export destination for Japanese enterprises, accounting for 31% of its total exports. [51]

15 semiconductor equipment suppliers before 2021 [49] from the perspective of IC, Japanese companies are better at manufacturing passive components, and most of these devices rely on the advantages of material technology, such as aluminum electrolytic capacitors, ceramic capacitors and so on.

In addition, Nissan has a small chip coverage and few enterprises, but it still has an advantage in specific areas. For example, Sony ranks first in the world in terms of image sensor chips, and Renesa Electronics, formed by the merger of NEC, Hitachi and Mitsubishi Motor Semiconductor departments, also has a global lead in vehicle semiconductors. Armour is one of the six major NAND Flash manufacturers in the world. [52]

Japan's main IC enterprise, tabulation? fruit shell hard technology in addition to the above companies, Japan also has many invisible champions. Ferrotec is a supplier of semiconductor equipment and materials in Japan. Its parts cleaning business and semiconductor precision quartz business account for 60% and 40% of the Chinese market respectively. Its thermoelectric semiconductor refrigerators, vacuum seals, power semiconductor substrates, semiconductor quartz products, precision ceramic products, machinable ceramics for probe boards, and silicon fusion products have a global market share of 35%, 65%, 10%, 15%, 11%, 90%, 90% [53] respectively. Weizhi supplies 99% of the ABF board-related materials in the world [15]. In addition, Asahi-Kasei, IBIDEN, Mitsui Chemical, Showa Electric, New Optoelectronics, Nagase, Nippon Electric and Zhipu are also important semiconductor companies. [54]

3. Japanese semiconductors made in China should not follow the old path of Japan, and it is not easy for Japanese semiconductors to be brilliant again. Expert analysis shows that in terms of today's development in Japan, returning to the level of 1980s will be an investment of at least US $78 billion to make up for the lack of investment for more than 20 years, and there is no other way. [55]

However, contrary to it, Japanese enterprises have been very conservative, especially in semiconductors, many companies have experienced fiasco, so even if they receive a large number of orders, they will not easily choose to expand production, but rather pursue to become a "small and beautiful" company. [56]

Judging from the current downward trend of overall demand for semiconductors, the advantages of Japanese enterprises in equipment and materials have gradually begun to weaken, and it is no longer feasible to sit on the old ground. According to the semiconductor equipment association (SEAJ), sales of semiconductor equipment in japan fell for the fifth month in a row in the year to February 2023, while SEAJ expects sales of semiconductor equipment in japan to fall to nearly 3.5 trillion yen this year, an annual decline of 5%, the first decline in four years. [57]

Not only that, the operating efficiency of Japanese enterprises has gradually declined. In the 2022 IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, Japan's comprehensive competitiveness dropped from 25th in 2018 to 34th (in 63 countries and regions). Throughout the past 20 years, the international competitiveness of Japanese enterprises has dropped from 20th to 30th, and the relevant indicators of business efficiency are all after 40th. [58]

Data related to Japan's World Competitiveness [58] in fact, Japanese semiconductors were in a situation very similar to that of domestic semiconductors, rising in a short period of time and being unreasonably suppressed by the United States, although we cannot avoid foreign tightening restrictions from the source, but learn from it:

Japan is insensitive to the change of production mode, and stubbornly insists on choosing vertical production mode in R & D and production, which is difficult to meet the market demand. Over time, the market will eliminate the products of these Japanese enterprises. [59]

Japan has failed to catch up with the market trend, not only paying no attention to markets such as microprocessors (CPU), cellular mobile technology and smartphones, but also the bottleneck of Japanese-style technology supremacy, making it increasingly difficult for Japanese enterprises to keep up with the pace of market development. [9]

Japan's industrial chain system is not resilient, lacks high-end manufacturing technology, and can only produce low-end products of 40nm, which forms a dualistic paradox with upstream competitive advantage; [3]

Closed-door development can not create advanced technology, only "bringing in and going out" can improve competitiveness.

In the Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement, the provision that "foreign products should account for 20% of Japan's market share" has become a killer mace of the United States, constantly asking Japan to open its market, while China should also take it as a warning, recognize the harm of the relevant provisions, and guard against US plots. [59]

With regard to Japan's abuse of export controls, the China Semiconductor Association said: China and Japan's semiconductor industries depend on each other and promote each other, and China has advantages in the fields of upstream raw materials, components and packaging. it has rich semiconductor product application scenarios and the largest semiconductor market, while Japan has advantages in semiconductor equipment, materials, specific semiconductor products, hardware integration and so on. The adoption of regulation will only further weaken the competitiveness of Japanese enterprises in the international market. [60]

In any case, the days of Japan lying down and eating old money are long gone, and domestic semiconductors with a similar history should also seek a new way of playing.

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[51] World wide Web: Japan calculates the consequences of semiconductor "ban". 2023.4.3. Https://tech.huanqiu.com/ article / 4CKyMHMgFQh

[52] Economic Information Daily: Japan Semiconductor Industry: no longer brilliant advantages still exist. 2021.9.6. Http://www.jjckb.cn/ 2021-09 Universe 06 / c_1310170031.htm

[53] Jingkai Capital: [Jingkai Capital | Industry Watch] uncover the invisible champion of global semiconductor equipment and materials: Japan Ferrotec | Zhongxin wafer .2021.5.31. Https://mp.weixin.qq.com/ s / vYBBrOssS_ndgJx-LSu2-g

[54] Semiconductor Industry Watch: invisible Champion of Japanese Semiconductor. 2021.6.23. Https://mp.weixin.qq.com/ s / 19vdcWjQMlHq6hfB8Dgimw

Wall Street Journal: Japan Once Led the World in Microchips. Now, It's Racing to Catch Up.2022.8.4. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2022-08-04 / business / japan-semiconductors-chips.html

[56] Micro Network: does Japan intend to restrict the export of photoresist to China? Domestic investors can't be more scared. 2023.3.10. Https://www.laoyaoba.com/ n / 851895

[57] Microwebs: sales of semiconductor equipment in Japan fell for five consecutive months. 2023.4.10. Https://www.laoyaoba.com/ n / 856123

[58] IMD: https://wwwcontent.imd.org/globalassets/wcc/docs/wco/pdfs/countries-landing-page/JP.pdf

[59] Li Haodong. The gains and losses of Japanese semiconductor industry and its enlightenment to China [J]. China Economic and Trade Guide (theoretical Edition), 2018, (17): 16-19.

[60] China Semiconductor Industry Association: regarding Japan's plan to expand the export control scope of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, the China Semiconductor Industry Association solemnly declares .2023.4.28. Https://mp.weixin.qq.com/ s / LkSWvzPj3GNJ6M5j8dY-4A

This article comes from the official account of Wechat: fruit Shell hard Technology (ID:guokr233), author: Fu Bin

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