Shulou(Shulou.com)11/24 Report--

This article comes from the official account of Wechat: knowledge Automation (ID:zhishipai), author: Lin Xueping

The big Japanese plane officially declared failure. This is a moment that may be difficult for the Japanese to accept. The project, established 20 years ago, cost 1 trillion yen for the first flight in 2013 and ended up at the halberd airport.

It may be hard to imagine. First, Japan is a manufacturing power, and there are things it cannot make? Second, this Japanese plane is not a large plane like the 919, but similar to the regional plane of China's ARJ21.

Technical capabilities cannot be attributed to the failure to develop aircraft. this is not entirely the case.

The threshold for aircraft manufacturing is as high as Qomolangma. In the history of commercial flight over the past hundred years, only two companies have survived today: Boeing and Airbus.

At that time, Britain, France and Sweden all had regional aircraft manufacturing capacity, but in the end they all had to give up. The failure of France Aerospace and Britain to build Concorde supersonic aircraft is also a major blow to Britain. Britain is no longer willing to build complete aircraft, but is willing to do a good job of key aircraft components, such as engines and on-board systems, and even helicopters are sold.

This is a calm choice of supply chain strategy, or simply a blood hole in the treasury.

The failure of a plane can change a country's strategy, including a business.

If Boeing had failed to develop the 747 at that time, it might not be alive today. Boeing faced huge financial difficulties at the time. The Luo Luo engine, which supports the French-British supersonic Concorde, had to be rescued by the British government because RB211 could not match the Concorde and fell into bankruptcy.

Interestingly, when the 747 was developed, it also had a rival model at Boeing, the Supersonic 2707, which corresponds to the French Supersonic Concorde and the Russian Tu-144s.

At that time, everyone thought that supersonic speed was the future direction of the aircraft, and no one was optimistic about the idea of intercontinental flight set by the 747. So Boeing allocated only a minimum of resources to the 747, and a large number of resources were concentrated in 2707. When the two planes reported to the Civil Aviation Administration, there was only one person in the 747, while 2707 had a team of more than 20 people.

However, the supersonic plane failed. Figure 144 exploded at the 1986 air show, and Concorde later closed. Supersonic aircraft are not the type of airlines at all.

Lockheed's L1011 and McDonnell McDonald's DC10 also failed.

The unexpected popularity of the 747, surpassing its rivals, proves that predicting future demand for civil aircraft is a dangerous thing. When an aircraft flies from design to final commercial debut, it is often 10 years later, and its life cycle spans 20 or 30 years. When an aircraft model starts to be designed, you don't know what's waiting for it.

The Japanese regional plane MRJ is faced with this situation. The technology should pass, but the market may not accept it in the future.

Two episodes are that Embraer and Bombardier's regional jets are now fragmented. Bombardier sold some of its aircraft capacity to Japan's Mitsubishi heavy Industries and the rest to Airbus, while Brazilian Airlines failed to sell to Boeing.

These failed cases make people aware of the two commandments of aircraft manufacturing. First, few of the late pursuers have been successful. Second, even with aircraft manufacturing capacity, it will be an expensive burden for a country and may be dumped at any time.

Now, there is no need to use the second, only the first will also trip Japan. Japan, as a global manufacturing power, was knocked to death on the threshold of aircraft manufacturing.

After World War II, Japan launched a comprehensive revival in the industrial field, including iron and steel, automobiles, shipbuilding, electronics and so on. The only thing that didn't break through was aircraft manufacturing. This is mixed with the humiliation of the internationalization of Japan's supply chain.

"catch-up and upgrading Strategy" records the development process of this period of catch-up and adjustment in Japan.

Japan's strategy of developing its own aircraft has been adjusted to suit its national conditions.

The first stage: catch up.

"build your own plane"! Such a catch-up strategy took place in 1958-1974. The Japanese government's Ministry of economy, Trade and Industry (similar to China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology) leads the 60-seat aircraft of YS-11, a domestic aircraft project. But after producing 182s, 1974 had to stop production. During this period, there is naturally arrogance and self-righteousness led by the government, and the turboprop technology adopted by YS11 is already an outdated product. At that time, as the chief expert, the "five Gentlemen of Big aircraft" still stuck in the era of military aircraft.

This has led to constant delays in listing, which is all too common.

But the bigger loophole is that Japanese aircraft manufacturers ignore the opinions of users.

At that time, the person in charge of aviation was the Ministry of Transport of Japan, which had a big fight with the Ministry of economy, Trade and Industry, which was in charge of industry. The two are naturally at odds with each other, resulting in severe injuries in the construction and use of the system.

The key protagonist appeared: Japan Airlines, such as all Nippon Airlines, do not buy Japan's domestic aircraft YS11. They prefer Airbus planes. Domestic airplanes are easy to stimulate public sentiment, but for airlines, this is a money-making tool, no different from the tractors in the hands of farmers, with great fuel saving and less maintenance, which is the definition of a good money-making tool.

It's the same with big planes. Considering the fierce competition among airlines, it is difficult for large aircraft to have the opportunity to iterate many times.

Unlike high-speed trains, which can increase speed step by step and iterate one by one, a model of an aircraft has to be good enough. Otherwise, the backward tools of the airlines will lose their blood.

If domestic planes are not as good as Boeing Airbus, buying them is a bloody knife for companies such as Japan's all Nippon Airlines.

This reveals an often hidden problem: aircraft companies need not only manufacturing capabilities, but also the ability to understand users' extraordinary operations.

The experience of Boeing and Airbus in this area can easily be overlooked.

People think that aircraft manufacturing is a manufacturing problem, but unexpectedly, it is also a marketing problem.

From the perspective of the supply chain, we need to distinguish between the main chain and the head of the chain. The owner of the chain is an integrator, such as GE engine and Foxconn contract factory, while the head of the chain has to face all kinds of users. Understanding the needs of users is also an essential skill, almost as important as technology.

The attempt of 60-seat aircraft made in Japan was naturally defeated due to the lack of experience in post-manufacturing activities. The aircraft projects arranged by Japanese government officials simply cannot gain competitive advantage. The voices of users, such as all Nippon Airways, were drowned out by loud government officials.

Failure is inevitable. Japan has to rethink its national policy of aircraft manufacturing.

The opportunity has come. Compared with the conservative European Airbus, Boeing in the United States is actively looking for a low-cost global supply chain, and Japan is in sight.

After 1975, Japan abandoned the self-built aircraft of the "catch-up" strategy, entered the second stage of the "upgrade" strategy, and gradually integrated into Boeing's global supply chain.

There are joys and sorrows in cooperation with Boeing.

It can be said that the Japanese aircraft manufacturer followed Boeing and experienced a triple jump. At first, the 747SP project, which was adapted specifically for the Japanese market by Boeing 747s in the 1970s, was a simple parts subcontractor. Later, in 1970-1980, Japan, as a participant in the Boeing 767 project, had begun to take some risks, which was a huge step forward. However, the Japanese manufacturing industry is not satisfied with this, feeling that they are just "bending the metal to a specified degree of curvature."

In the 1990s, the capacity of Japan's aviation supply chain was greatly improved and became a project partner of Boeing 777. So far, Japan Airlines supply chain has been strictly tempered.

When it comes to Boeing Dreamliner 787, Japan has risen to become a strategic partner, accounting for 35% of the workload. Of these, nearly 50% of the composite materials for 787 aircraft are borne by Japan. Japanese Toray's carbon fiber has finally gained a new market in addition to fishing rods and golf balls.

However, this is also a history of compromise.

In the Boeing 767 project launched in 1975, Japan initially had four key demands for "Japanese independence", including different plans for R & D and production, including having a final assembly line.

Four big demands were directly rejected by Boeing: accept it or be out.

Japan had to tearfully swallow all the overlord terms proposed by Boeing.

For the break-up of the supply chain, Boeing has long made it clear that it will never be touched by the Japanese with gold-rich technology. Similar to the wing box or the pressure box, because it does not contain advanced technology, it can be put to Japan.

Here, Japan has no room for bargaining.

At that time, Japanese home appliances and cars were sweeping the market in the United States, but they were humiliated in front of American aircraft manufacturers.

This is the supply chain black hole formed by the duopoly of aircraft manufacturing. All partners can only be lost and have no self.

When Boeing's supply chain globalisation proved successful, conservative Airbus came, hoping to work with Japanese manufacturers.

But the overbearing Boeing made trouble directly and warned Mitsubishi heavy Industries by name. This makes Japan's attempt to find a second partner to form an equilibrium mechanism completely bankrupt.

Mitsubishi heavy Industries was the main force that later assumed the role of MRJ, a Japanese regional plane.

This is the supply chain black hole of oligopoly: the world revolves around two aircraft companies as the head of the chain, plus the three main engine chains-GE Roro and Pratt & Whitney. The global supply chain of aircraft is naturally suffocating. In that year, French Safran Group cooperated with GE of the United States to produce a very successful CFM56 engine.

But it was a big sell, and Safran never got the hot-end technology of the engine from its American partners.

France's ability to make engines is still at the level of its own technology. The high-end technology of American engines is still in their own hands.

CFM56 sweeps the world's commercial engines, accounting for 40% of the market, with more than 33000 installed units.

From the narrative point of view of the Chinese people's favorite "market for technology", France has not obtained advanced technology from the joint venture. However, this does not affect business success and the huge improvement of supply chain capabilities.

In fact, there are not many conspiracy theories about the division of labor in the supply chain. Even if it speaks by strength, it is also very transparent.

The supply chain of aircraft manufacturing is the most unique one of the global industrial supply chain. It is a big Yamen with strict hierarchy.

It is easiest to see the attributes of the supply chain from here.

It must cooperate globally, but technology is also strictly controlled by boundaries. The flow of knowledge across borders is almost blocked.

Even so, JAL's strategy, from overtaking to upgrading, is undoubtedly successful. It is fully integrated into the express train of the globalization of the aviation industry. These successful supply chains should rejoice in the Japanese manufacturing community. They could not forget the humiliation of the 1970s, so the Japanese regional plane MRJ was put on the agenda again in 2004, and Mitsubishi heavy Industries submitted its design plan confidently. There are many hopeful orders, and the test flight has been repeatedly postponed.

With strong supply chain integration resources, Japan still does not master the integrated design of aircraft. American teachers have never taught this ability, it requires constant trial and error, and the cost of groping alone is too high.

Japan's regional jet MRJ was frozen in 2019. The investment is too large, this is a blood hole, Mitsubishi heavy Industries really can not bear, so these two days officially announced the end. The localization of Japanese aircraft failed again. This makes people feel that even if it is made in Japan, there are times when it cannot be made.

However, the more accurate judgment actually comes from the concerns of the market.

The market is not clear, and the market for this regional plane, which is located in a 60-seat aircraft, is increasingly shrinking. The market may not exist, and Japan Airlines will not pay the bill in the future. even if there is strong pressure from the Japanese government, airlines buy aircraft in order to make money, and the government cannot let airlines bear the losses.

Japan's regional MRJ also has orders for 600 from Japan Airlines. Of course, those booking orders on paper cannot be called false orders, but they are definitely just an expression of good intentions. It is important to build it, but it depends on the performance in the future.

Japan's abandonment once again proved the cruelty of aircraft manufacturing.

This not only reminds people of China's large aircraft 919, to be able to build is an amazing achievement.

And 100 regional ARJ aircraft have been built.

These achievements are far from indicating the success of China's aircraft manufacturing, and there is still a lot of way to go in the future. Whether airlines using ARJ aircraft can really make money, this is the root of the challenge. How many derivative models can the 919 have? supporting airlines can build aircraft combination formations.

The legend of the 747 lies in its fuselage plasticity. From the beginning, it was designed with the doubles performance of both passenger and warehouse. This allows it to produce many derivative models to meet a variety of airline configurations.

Aircraft manufacturing companies need the ability to have an in-depth understanding of customer needs. The technical capabilities and marketing of aircraft companies are like a U-shaped magnet that stands out at both ends. It is dangerous to predict the future, and it is difficult to grasp the changing needs of the Aviation Division. This is a bigger challenge that Comac may face in addition to its technology.

The manufacture of Japanese-made aircraft is expected to come to an end for quite a long time. However, its failure has left us a profound lesson. It is gratifying that airplanes can be built. However, it was only a candlelight on the eve of the long night.

A brief introduction to the author

Lin Xueping: general Manager of Beijing Lianxun Power Consulting Co., Ltd., visiting researcher of China quality Research Institute of Shanghai Jiaotong University

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